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1. AbstractThe increase of internal inequality is one of the consequences of the recent turbulence of the World economy and the crisis’ effects in advanced countries. At the same time, to face the new information age and the phenomena of digitalization and robotization, investment in research and development (R&D) is an indisputable action for economic and social progress. The combi-nation of these two dynamics opens new debates about the still unresolved relationship between innovation and inequality. This paper contrasts the postulates of the existing body of theory and the existing empirical evidence to argue that the positive co-evolution of inequality reduction and technological progress in Europe is not a lineal process, but it requires to analyze its complexity 
and what sort of combination of factors would best explain it. The findings are based on regres-sions with panel data from a sample of 20 countries in the period 1995-2017, and they show the relevance of structural and institutional aspects within the European region. In particular, two 
clusters of countries seem to define a dissimilar behavior in the relationship between inequality 
and innovation and a virtuous circle defined by the contribution of social protection and innova-tion policies contributes to a favorable solution of the puzzle between innovation and inequality.
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53. Introduction
The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the subsequent macroeconomic shocks, such as the international economic recession, have fostered a diverse set of economic policies. The rise of income inequality in the advanced economies, as well as the high concentration at the top of the distribution are two of the main aspects that focus the attention of both poli-cymakers and academics. Although concept of inequality and its effects on economic growth is a controversial topic, there is also certain agreement about the persistence of a negative impact for sustainable growth, as well as for other welfare and social conditions, while some 
evidence confirms that under certain condi-tions higher equality rates can foster economic growth (Ostry, Berg and Tsangarides, 2014)Some crucial facts illustrate the recent evolution of inequality in the last years:
• While the bottom half of adults co-llectively owns less than 1% of total wealth, the richest decile (top 10% of adults) owns 85% of global wealth, and the top percentile (1%) alone ac-counts for almost half of all household wealth (47%) (Credit Suisse, 2018).
• Income in hands of the top 10% poo-rest people have risen less than 3$/year in 1988-2011, while incomes of the top 1% richest have been multi-plied by 182 (Credit Suisse, 2016).
• There are still 3.4 billion people (almost half of humanity) living on less than $5.50 a day (OXFAM Intermon, 2019)Some decades ago inequality was approached as a particular issue of develo-ping countries. However, it becomes a global concern due to the rising inequality trend. Globalization and technological change are widely supported as the main drivers of this ri-sing trend. However, while it is likely that this relationship affects more to advanced econo-mies, they display different rates of inequality growth. Whether there are other main drivers apart from technological change and globali-
zation, other elements that bias their influence in equality have not been profoundly studied. A different driver beside technological change and globalization is the structure of the welfa-re State, which works as a counterweight as-pect of inequality. There is an intense debate over the topic of welfare State expansion, and whether it is harmful for economic growth and globalization or not. Recent studies show that public social expenditures might actua-
lly stimulate economic growth along with lowering inequality (Tridico & Meloni, 2018).Labor market institutions, such as Union density or collective bargaining, have recently been found to be very good predictors of the rise in equality, so it´s necessary to take them into consideration for a better understanding of the problem (Jaumotte and Osorio, 2015) (Kristal and Cohen, 2016). Innovation institutions can 
also influence the rise in inequality because this is a process that works as a central engine that fosters technological change, and it´s deeply 
influenced by globalization (Freeman, 2011). 
This is the reason that justifies to analyze here how the internationalization of techno-logy and innovation in the dynamics of glo-
bal economy may influence inequality. These two phenomena foster job creation (and the-refore income), polarization by shifting the global demand of labor force in favor of high 
qualified workers (Skill Biased Technological Change) and, in the last decades, the reduc-tion of the number of routine related jobs due to automation (Routine Biased Technologi-cal Change) (Goos, Manning and Salomons, 2014). Other processes like offshoring or de-localization along the global value chain, are also consequences of the internationalization of technology, and hence affect inequality by increasing capital share while decreasing la-bor. On the other hand, knowledge and tech-nology spillovers, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) or social promotion possibilities are also important consequences of technologi-cal globalization that should be considered as they can counterbalance the former ones. As seen in Aghion et al (2015), innovation 
process generates profits appropriated by 
the 1% wealthiest at first stage. This influen-ces both inter and intra countries inequality. However, this innovation outcomes can per-meate the lowest strata and therefore help to decrease inequality (Aghion, 2016). Thus, it is relevant to identify what mechanisms deter-mine the positive or negative impact of inno-vation in inequality, whether they perform at a regional or a global scope and whether they can be a matter of economic policy or not. This paper looks at the determinants of inequality rise in advanced economies, par-ticularly at those that work as counterba-lance, focusing on the relationship between innovation institutions and the distribu-tion of incomes. It also analyzes the impact of welfare State through social protection and labor market institutions as they have 
great influence in the outcomes distribution.The working hypothesis is that the re-
6lationship between innovation and wel-fare state institutions and inequality relies more profoundly on structural-tradi-tional institutions rather than on conjunc-tural policies. This statement is supported by the econometric analysis performed. 
The findings will reveal that innovation and welfare State institutions are associated with the rise of income inequality in the econo-mies under analysis. Some composite indexes are built to measure these institutions, hel-ping to understand the phenomena as a whole. 
Two clusters of countries are identified when looking at the interaction between these institutions and inequality, one is composed by countries with ample innovation and wel-fare institutions and low inequality, and the other is composed by countries with relati-vely poorer institutions and higher inequality. 
However, it is not possible to affirm that policies fostering R&D expenditu-res or social protection would necessary work in order to reduce the inequality rise. In fact, in some cases it could result in more harmful distributional outcomes. Both innovation and welfare State ins-titutions depend strongly on economic poli-cies, which are highly biased by ideology, but also by structural traditional institutions. The possibility of an equal economic growth is an important objective for policymakers, and 
this also justifies the realization of this study. Thus, economic policies promoting and developing innovation and welfare state institutions should be decided country by country and taking into accounts other de-terminants and institutions, which are clear-ly relevant and should be considered in or-der to understand the whole phenomenon. To sum up, the theoretical and em-pirical reasons for the relevance of the joint analysis of innovation institutions and income distribution are the following:
• Technological change and globaliza-tion are main drivers of inequality.
• Internationalization of technology and innovation that results from glo-balization have effects on inequality.
• Differences in inequality exist between si-milarly advanced and globalized regions.These reasons, in addition to the pre-sent debate surrounding inequality, the he-
terogeneous findings in economic literatu-re and the lack of robust results at a global 
scale encourage this paper to fill this gap. This paper is not an exhaustive policy brief, but it provides a global vision conside-ring economic and social heterogeneity in the 
comprehension of the phenomena as well as the orientation of economic policies, that con-tributes to the debate. This is achieved by per-forming a harmonized, homogeneous and in-ternational analysis drawn on the experience of 20 European economies from 1995 to 2017. The next section contains a brief litera-ture review that builds the conceptual fra-mework. The third section presents some facts about inequality and its main drivers. The empirical analysis is in section fourth as well as the discussion of estimations results. Fina-
lly, conclusions are presented in section fifth. 
4. BackgroundThe approach to the complex relationship between innovation and inequality requires to take a brief glance at the traditional theore-tical framework of economic growth and, se-
condly, to focus on the more specific literature.The inclusion of technological change as an exogenous or endogenous factor is the touchstone that will help to classify the more traditional theories of economic growth.Theories that consider technological change as an exogenous factor do not look at it as a component of growth, and therefore depends on given investment rates.  At this point, there are three main theoretical models: Harrod-Domar model emphasizes labor and capital stock and productivity natural growth rates as drivers of economic growth. Divergence from these growth rates would cause short term distortions and economic cy-cle. Innovation depends on investment, which is a constant (Harrod, 1939; Domar, 1946).On the other hand, Kaldor model empha-sizes the role of manufacturing sector and states that capital accumulation relates to te-chnical progress through investments done by high-rent capitalists. Therefore, innovation re-lies on their propensity to save (Kaldor, 1957)And Solow model, which emphasizes long-term growth and aims to explain it by looking at capital accumulation, labor force growth, and increases in productivity. The last is assimilated to technical progress and usually is assumed to remain constant (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956). Theories that consider technical change as an endogenous factor hold that investment in human capital, knowledge and innovation are relevant components of economic growth.However, some models prioritize some agents over others. For example, models 
prioritizing human capital are: first, Romer I model, that emphasizes capital diminishing 
7returns and externalities and holds that te-chnical change is not a constant and depends on capital accumulation. Innovation fosters progress via technical change, so in this model a negative relation between innovation and inequality is implied (Romer, 1986). Barro 
and Romer II model modifies Romer I model by introducing education as a direct deter-minant of production level. Innovation here is the result of R&D investment, and therefo-
re defined by agents’ election. Thus, innova-tion causes progress, so the negative impact in inequality is still present (Romer, 1994).On the other hand, Aghion and Howitt mo-del focuses on innovation and human capital, and analyzes the relationship the other way around too, holding that inequality inhibits knowledge accumulation and consequently in-novation (Aghion & Howitt, 2009). Lucas mo-del also emphasizes human capital and holds that technology is a public good, and thus it may have a redistributive factor (Lucas, 1988).There are models that prioritize com-panies over human capital, such as the Guellec and Ralle model, which holds that innovative companies and temporary mo-nopolies are responsible of technical chan-ge, and might increase inequality via pa-tent monopolies (Guellec & Ralle, 1991).The evolutionary model of Nelson & Win-ter (1987), focuses on behaviors conducted by companies that determine innovation rates and directly affect economic growth and progress.At this point, it´s important to review the concept of innovation by Schumpeter who sta-tes that it is the central engine of the capitalist system. This last one is an irregular system with business cycles that depend on entrepreneu-rs’ role and creative destruction. It’s a process that describes how the entrepreneur creates markets by innovating, what expels old compa-nies and business models (Schumpeter, 1961)
There is also specific literature that is more heterogeneous, although some key points can be presented as follows:
• Innovation is in fact related to in-equality and fosters social mobility (Aghion, 2016). The relation is thou-
gh complex and conflicting eviden-ce is found in the related literature.
• It depends on multiple variables such as policies, regulations, innovation typolo-gy, asymmetric information or market decisions among others  (Zweimüller, 2000; Anderton & Oscarson, 2002; Do-negan & Lowe, 2008; Arocena & Sutz, 2009; Valdivia, 2010; Lazonick & Ma-zzucato, 2013; Li, Sato & Sicular, 2013; 
Cozzens & Thakur, 2014; Aghion et al., 2015; Mongelli & Rullani,  2017).
• There is empirical evidence that profit ge-nerated by innovation is appropriated by 
the wealthiest top 1% in first term, but on the long run inequality diminishes because 
benefits are redistributed (Aghion, 2016).
• No significant evidence is found in UE, while it actually is in the USA and in In-dia. However, the relationship between innovation and inequality is positive in 
the first case (Lee & Rodríguez-Pose, 2012) and negative in the second case (Ojha, Pradhan & Ghosh, 2013). The rela-tionship has also been studied with less clear results in UK & USA (Aghion, 2002; Anderton & Oscarson, 2002; Aghion, 2015); Latin America (Arocena & Sutz, 2009); Canada (Kogler & Breau, 2014); and China (Li, Sato & Sicular, 2013).
• It´s important to study other faces of inequality, particularly those related with gender (Karatas-Özkan & Che-ll, 2013) or education (Aghion, 2002).
• Innovation promotes knowledge spread reaching every population stra-ta (Lucas, 1988; Aghion and Howi-tt, 1992; Radosevic & Yoruk, 2016).
• Automation has triggered wage polari-zation in the last decades via increase of the demand of high-skilled workers (Ski-ll Biased Technological Change) (Autor, 1999) or via substitution of routine-based jobs (Routine Biased Technological Chan-ge) (Goos, Manning & Salomons, 2014), but it can potentially create more jobs than it has destroyed (Berger & Frey, 2016). 
5. Some relevant facts
InequalityThere are multiple indicators that allow us to approach inequality empirically. The 
most relevant indicators are Gini Coeffi-cient after social transfers, the S80/S20 Ra-tio and the Top 10 Income; other measures 
such as Gini Coefficient before social trans-fers, or the Top 1 Income are also taken into consideration here for control purposes. Graph 1 illustrates the rise of inequali-ty during the period for which data is broad-ly available. The variables represented are accumulated growth rates of aggregated 
yearly means of Gini Coefficient after so-cial transfers (cum_gini), Top 10 Income 
(cum_top10), Gini Coefficient before social 
8transfers (cum_giniat), Top 1 (cum_top1) and Income Ratio S80/S20 (cum_s8020). The option has been to point out the year 2009 to indicate the year when the 
financial crisis shock reached Europe. 
Graph 1. Evolution of inequality measu-
res, 2004-2017
Sources: Eurostat, World Inequality Indicators. Note: Economies included: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Den-mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ire-land, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and United KingdomThe most relevant appreciation is that, regardless the measure, inequality has risen in this period in Europe, but this trend is also observable on the previous decades as it has been analyzed elsewhere (Iversen & Soski-ce, 2009; Jaumotte and Osorio, 2015; Kristal and Cohen, 2016; Ahlquist & Ansell, 2017).The only measure of inequality that doesn’t consider welfare state institutions 
is the Gini Coefficient before social trans-fers, and its slope is the steepest; then, it’s plausible to assume that social pro-tection has a large impact on inequality.However, as stated before and accordin-gly to some thesis like the neoamerican-Re-nan models by Michel Albert (1992) or like the two-clusters statement found in Iversen & Soskice (2009), not all countries have fo-llowed the same pattern of inequality rise. In fact, they are clustered in two groups that 
are defined according the following aspects:
• A group formed by the most advan-ced countries, these geographically lo-cated in the center of the continent.
• And another group formed by relati-vely less advanced countries and the Anglo-Saxon countries included in this study (United Kingdom and Ireland).Therefore, both groups are analyzed separately in Graph 2, and differences are appreciable in the evolution of the different 
inequality indicators previously mentioned.
The first noticeable difference is that whi-le in most advanced economies inequality has risen regardless of the measure, in those less 
advanced only Gini Coefficient before social transfers has risen and the measures that take welfare state institutions into consideration remain stable or even show a decreasing trend. It’s striking that the years with the biggest de-crease rate in inequality measured by Gini Co-
efficient are those right after the crisis stroke Europe. The most plausible explanation for this, seems to be that more advanced countries have lower levels of inequality than less advan-ced ones, and that makes it harder to reduce inequality substantially. In addition, the global economic shock triggered the countercyclical mechanisms of social protection in less advan-ced economies because of the rise in unemplo-
yment and other economic afflictions suffered in a greater way in these countries. This would mean that as the less advanced economies are getting closer to the more advanced ones, convergence is taking place at a slow path.
Graph 2. Inequality evolution by countries, 
2004-2017
Sources: Eurostat, World Inequality Indicators. Note: Economies included: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Den-mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ire-land, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom
9InnovationInnovation is a complex process to me-asure, and thus three main related variables are jointly analyzed here. Two of them are resources, or inputs for carrying out innova-tion. In particular, Research & Development (R&D) expenditures as percentage of Gross Domestic Product and R&D personnel and re-searchers as percentage of total labor force. The other variable that is also a good indica-tor for innovation outputs, is the number of patent applications at the European Patent 
Office per million of active population. Other variables related to innovation like broadband subscriptions per 100 people, exports comple-
xity or gross fixed capital formation are also taken into consideration in order to comple-
te the picture. To have a first general glance at innovation, Graph 3 displays accumula-ted growth rates of aggregated yearly mean of R&D expenditures as percentage of GDP.
Graph 3. Evolution of R&D expenditures, 2004-
2017 
Sources: Eurostat. Note: Economies included: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-lands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Swe-den and United KingdomThere is a clear trend shift right after the 
financial crisis strike, because of the increa-se in social protection spending that coun-tries needed to carry out. However, it seems that R&D expenditures have permanently slowed down its increasing path. An interes-ting fact is that the less advanced economies have been increasing its R&D expenditures relatively faster than the more advanced ones, probably because they had, and sti-ll show lower values in this indicator. This means that they are converging, and hence succeeding in the catching-up process (Abra-movitz, 1986; Fagerberg & Godinho, 2003).With the objective of analyzing innova-
tion as just one, though complicated phe-nomenon, a composite index is elaborated including multiple variables as follows1:
Innoindex=(Broadbandnorm + R&Dnorm + Patnorm + 
Personorm + ECInorm)/5This composite index is built by perfor-ming an arithmetic average of the normalized values of the variables studied. The motivation behind it is the scarcity of available data regar-ding composite measurements for innovation. The variables selected are representative of di-fferent components from indexes like European Innovation Scoreboard or Global Innovation Index; particularly, the next four are included: 
• ICT connectivity conditions: (Broadband) Fixed Broadband subscriptions per 100 people
• Knowledge Investment: (R&D) R&D expenditure as percentage of GDP
• Technological performance: (Pat) Patent applications to the EPO per M. of active population.
• Human resources: (Perso) R&D personnel and researchers as percentage of total labor force
• Economic Complexity Index2 (ECI)
Welfare StateWelfare state is approached by the ac-cumulated growth rates of aggregated year-ly mean of expenditures in social protec-tion as percentage of GDP, distinguishing between more and less advanced economies. In Graph 4, years 2007 and 2009 are poin-ted out because social protection expenditures 
shift towards a big increase in the first year and stagnates and returns to its decreasing path in the second year. A plausible explana-tion for this fact would be that in 2007 the 
financial crisis started in the USA, and hence triggers social protection mechanisms in the studied economies. In 2009, austerity measu-res start to show up in some European coun-tries, and these were consolidated around 2010. Moreover, less advanced economies have higher growth rates of social protection expenditures, probably because they start from lower rates, but in the last years of the sample, the more advanced economies sur-1. Composite Indexes are built following the “Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators”, by OECD, 2008.2. Economic Complexity Index (ECI) measures the knowledge intensity of an economy by considering the knowledge intensity of the products it exports. It´s ela-borated by the Observatory of Economic Complexity
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pass the less advanced ones in accumulated growth rate of social protection expenditu-res, as a consequence of austerity measures in south-European countries (Krugman, 2012). 
Graph 4. Evolution of social protection, 2004-
2017 
Sources: Eurostat. Note: Economies included: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-lands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Swe-den and United Kingdom
Labor marketLabor market institutions are measured with two variables widely studied in the re-lated literature: Union density and collective bargaining (Card, Lemieux, & Riddell, 2004; Iversen & Soskice, 2009; Jaumotte and Oso-rio, 2015, Kristal & Cohen, 2016). Graph 5 illustrates the accumulated growth rates of aggregated yearly mean of Union density, dis-tinguishing between more and less advanced economies. Due to scarcity of data, the graph is not accurate and thus only the general trend can be analyzed. There is a clearly negative and fast speed behavior since the last deca-des of the XXth Century (Card, Lemieux, & Ri-ddell, 2004; Iversen & Soskice, 2009; Jaumo-tte and Osorio, 2015, Kristal & Cohen, 2016). 
Graph 5. Evolution of Union Density, 2004-2017 
Sources: OECD Note: Economies included: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-lands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Swe-den and United Kingdom
Correlation graphs
To observe the potential influence of so-cial protection and welfare state in inequa-lity, several graphs presented in the Annex illustrate the relationship existing between 
both Gini Coefficients before and after so-cial transfers and the different phenome-na of interest in this study: Innovation, so-cial protection expenditures and labor.All three phenomena display a much 
more significant and negative correlation with inequality if this last is measured with 
Gini Coefficient after social transfers. This is plausibly related to the redistributing power of innovation, social protection and labor. This seems to be quite reasonable sin-ce social protection expenditures is the base for social redistribution, and then, the 
weak correlation found with Gini Coeffi-cient before social transfers is likely due to structural reasons. Therefore, this main-ly refers to differences between countries.For a better understanding of the studied phenomena, Graphs 6 and 7 illustrate corre-
lations, first, between country means of Gini 
Coefficient after social transfers and GDP, se-condly regarding innovation, and also with labor and social protection expenditures:
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Graph 6. Gini Coefficient and GDP per capita 
Sources: Eurostat, World Inequality Indicators. Note: Economies included: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Den-mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ire-land, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and United KingdomRegarding the relationship between coun-tries’ Gini and GDP per capita, the two clus-tered groups seem to emerge. Anglo-Saxon countries (United Kingdom and Ireland) are outliers because although being relatively wealthy, they tend to present high levels of in-equality because of structural and traditional tendencies (Albert, 1992). Hungary is also a special outlier due to its low inequality rates that have their roots in Communism times. Second, the relationship between Gini 
Coefficient and the Composite Innovation In-dex  show in Graph 7 a picture in which the clusters are even more noticeable. It happens the same when looking at innovation inputs such as R&D expenditure and R&D person-nel and at a technological output like patent applications at EPO separately (see Annex). 
Graph 7. Gini Coefficient and Composite Index 
for Innovation 
Sources: Eurostat, World Inequality Indicators. Note: Economies included: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Den-mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ire-land, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom
At this point, the question is whether it is plausible to accept that the two clusters 
remain significant, and how innovation ac-tually is still a good predictor of inequality between countries. Hungary and United King-dom consolidate as outliers. It also happens at the Nordic countries but Norway, which could make a group apart as they gather in the bottom right corner, meaning that they have ample innovation institutions and hold the lowest inequality rates of the sample. However, no assumption can be made if other relevant variables are not conside-
red. Therefore, Gini Coefficient is interac-ted with social protection and labor mar-ket institutions in the following paragraphs.When correlating social protection ex-penditures and unemployment rate with 
Gini Coefficient (see Annex), a substantial relationship is found, and, though less sig-
nificantly, the two clusters examined above are appreciable too. The social protection ex-penditures variable can distort the results if 
the dimension of beneficiary population is not taken into consideration; then, the pro-blem is treated using the relative social pro-tection expenditure per unemployment rate. This new variable helps to analyze the di-rect impact of social protection in inequali-ty, instead of the countries’ spending effort. The issue is that when interacting social protection expenditures and unemployment rate, clusters are even more evident in Graph 8. It is obvious that advanced (or Renan-ty-
pe) countries don’t form a well-defined clus-ter, and this is due to two main reasons: the existence of policy divergences between these countries regarding social protection, and the fact that United Kingdom is an outlier case.
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Graph 8. Gini Coefficient and Social protection 
expenditures / unemployed population
Sources: Eurostat, World Inequality Indicators. Note: Economies included: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Den-mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ire-land, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom
Union density vs Gini Coefficient in Gra-ph 9 still display the less advanced plus An-glo-Saxon economies group and the Nordic but Norway group, but the continental or Re-nan economies exhibit divergences in Union density rates. In fact, the negative correlation displayed is caused by Nordic countries with very high union density and low inequali-ty, versus Mediterranean countries (Spain, Portugal and Greece) with the opposite.
Graph 9. Gini Coefficient and Union Density 
Sources: OECD, World Inequality Indicators. Note: Eco-nomies included: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portu-gal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and United KingdomWhen looking at collective bargai-ning power (see Annex) or labor composi-te index in Graph 10, no appreciable clus-ters are found, only a slightly negative correlation, due to Union density component:
Graph 10. Gini Coefficient and Composite Index 
for Labor Force 
Sources: OECD, World Inequality Indicators. Note: Eco-nomies included: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portu-gal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and United KingdomIt seems that both innovation and so-cial protection is a combination that allows 
us to define two clusters of countries. The-se two dimensions are correlated and the relationship can be seen in Graph 11:
Graph 11. Social protection expenditures and 
Composite Index for Innovation
 Sources: Eurostat, World Inequality Indicators. Note: Economies included: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Den-mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ire-land, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and United KingdomThe correlation is high (74%) and posi-tive. Countries that perform better in inno-vation variables spend more in social pro-tection, and also have lower inequality rates as seen above. These are three nuances of progress, and seems reasonable to think that policies affecting one of them could have im-plications in the others; this question will be addressed in next section of this paper.
Although the two clusters are well defi-
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ned, a couple of aspects should be mentioned. United Kingdom is part of the most advanced economies cluster because it has a good per-formance in innovation and it’s slightly above the mean in social protection expenditures. Meanwhile, Italy is an outlier because, as it happens in other macroeconomic aspects, it 
is defined by some characteristics of a Medite-rranean country, such as the case of innovation performance, and at the same time some cha-racteristics of a Renan or continental country, as in the case of social protection expenditures.
 
6. Empirical Analysis and Discussion of 
ResultsTo analyze how the previously refe-rred variables are related with inequa-lity evolution in countries, panel re-gressions have been chosen. Different 
specifications are used to contrast the poten-tial impact of the relationships under certain assumptions and these are explained below.The empirical analysis is based coun-try-level time series and cross section data with a sample of 20 European countries covering the period from 1995 to 2017.A simple scan of the dataset indica-tes the presence of multiple missing data, in some cases randomly distributed while not in some others. The option of interpola-
tion has been rejected to avoid an artificia-lly narrowing process of standard errors. In the baseline models the dependent va-
riables in the different estimations are first, 
natural logarithms of Gini Coefficient after social transfers; second, S80/S20 Ratio; and third, Top 10 Income share. The indepen-dent variables are innovation institutions, social protection, labor market institutions and a vector of controls, including other de-terminants of inequality such as GDP per capita and Gross Fixed Capital Formation. 
Country fixed effects are included in order 
to capture country specific determinants. The general equations for esti-mation purposes is presented below:
ln(gini_dt)it  = α1 Xit+β1 Yit+ γ1Zit+ δ1Sit+ μ1i+ ϵit
ln(s80s20)it  = α2Xit+β2Yit+ γ2Zit+ δ2Sit+ μ2i+ ϵit
ln(Top10)it  = α3Xit+β3Yit+ γ3Zit+ δ3Sit+ μ3i+ ϵitwhere, * i Denotes the country * t Denotes the year 
* X Denotes the innovation institutions variables * Y Denotes the social protection variable * Z Denotes the labor market institutions variables* S Denotes the vector of control compo-sed by other determinants of inequality 
* μ Denotes the country fixed-effects.With the aim of developing a rigorous econometric analysis, some of the best-known panel data tests have been performed. 
First, a Hausman specification test is run to evaluate the consistency of a random-effects 
estimator versus a less efficient fixed effects estimator. It consists in the evaluation of the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, i.e. existence of correlation between the unique errors and the regressors in the model. The p-value of the test is less than 0.05, what means that the null hypothesis of random-effects consistency can be rejected and the presence of unobserved heterogeneity can be assumed.Second, a Pesaran test is run to evaluate the 
consistency and if the fixed effects estimator is unbiased. It does so by evaluating the presence of cross sectional dependence in the errors. Pe-
saran test is selected because it’s the most effi-cient test for unbalanced panel data in which the number of observations is bigger than the 
years (N>T) (De Hoyos & Sarafidis, 2006). The p-value of the test is less than 0.05, what means that the null hypothesis of cross-sec-tional errors independency can be rejected. Third, a Wooldridge test is run to eva-luate the presence of serial-correlation that could bias the standard errors and therefore 
cause the results to be less efficient. Wooldri-dge test is selected because it can be applied under general conditions and is easy to im-plement (Drukker, 2003). The p-value of the test is less than 0.05, what means that the null hypothesis of no serial-correlation in the idiosyncratic errors can be rejected. Last but not least, a Breusch-Pagan and a White test are run to evaluate the presence of heteroscedasticity, i.e. variability of the varian-ces of the standard errors. The p-values of the tests are both less than 0.05, what means the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity can be rejected. Given the presence of correlation between the unique errors and the regressors, cross sectional dependence, serial-correlation and heteroscedasticity, and following the recom-mendations of Beck & Katz (1995), the estima-tor selected is the Ordinary Least Squares with Panel Corrected Standard Errors. The varia-bles are used in natural logarithms in order to 
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estimate elasticities produced by the indepen-dent variables. The output of the estimation of the baseline model is presented in Table 1:
Table 1. Estimation results. Baseline modelLn(Gini 
coefficient)
Ln(S80/S20 ratio) Ln(Top10 income)Ln(GDP per capita) 0.040 0.116 0.065***(0.573) -1.034 -3.622Ln(GFCF) -0.103 -0.222** -0.048**(-1.585) (-2.288) (-2.338)Ln(Economic Complexity Index) 0.005 -0.000 0.007(0.221) (-0.004) (0.736)Ln(Patent appli-cations) -0.022 -0.065 -0.020*(-0.901) (-1.502) (-1.829)Ln(R&D exp) -0.159*** -0.219** -0.031*(-3.038) (-2.361) (-1.752)Ln(R&D person-nel) 0.057 -0.011 0.012-1.346 (-0.131) (0.826)Ln(Broadband) 0.011** 0.018* -0.003*-2.137 -1.782 (-1.916)Ln(SP exp. per unemployed) 0.036 0.025 -0.007-1.008 (0.458) (-0.899)Ln(Union density) 0.110 0.164 -0.005-1.491 -1.401 (-0.217)Ln(Right to bar-gain) -0.137* -0.264** -0.046**(-1.928) (-2.228) (-2.522)Constant 3.634*** 2.052 2.507***-4.081 -1.491 -11.745R-squared 0.997 0.974 0.999* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01The estimates of the baseline model -Ta-ble 1- show that  the natural logarithm of Re-search and Development expenditures as per-
centage of GDP, the natural logarithm of fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 people and the natural logarithm of the right to bargain 
as percentage of labor force result significant. 
The coefficients are consistent with the theory in the cases of R&D spending and Bargaining Power, but this is not the case for Broadband subscriptions, because it exhibits a positive 
correlation with Gini Coefficient, but negative with S80/S20 Ratio and Top 10 Income Share.A 1% increase in R&D expenditures de-creases inequality by 0.16%, 0.22% and 
0.03% measured by Gini Coefficient, S80/S20 Ratio and Top 10 Income Share, respectively. A 1% decrease in the workers with the right to bargain increases inequali-ty by 0.14%, 0.26% and 0.05% measu-
red by Gini Coefficient, S80/S20 Ratio and Top 10 Income Share respectively.To study this phenomena more dee-ply, the next model alternatively uses the composite indexes presented above to es-timate the correlation with inequality: 
ln(gini_dt)it  = α4Xit+β4Yit+ γ4Zit+ δ4Sit+ μ4i+ ϵit
ln(s80s20)it  = α5Xit+β5Yit+ γ5Zit+ δ5Sit+ μ5i+ ϵit
ln(Top10)it  = α6Xit+β6Yit+ γ6Zit+ δ6Sit+ μ6i+ ϵitwhere,* i Denotes the country * t Denotes the year * X Denotes the Innovation Index * Y Denotes the social protection variable * Z Denotes the Labor Index* S Denotes the vector of control compo-sed by other determinants of inequality 
* μ Denotes the country fixed-effects.The output of the estimation of the Indexes model is presented in table 2:
Table 2. Estimation results. Composite Indexes 
TSCS modelLn(Gini 
coefficient)
Ln (S80/S20 ratio) Ln(Top10 income)Ln(GDP per capita) 0.050 0.106 0.040**(0.781) (0.929) -2.509Ln(GFCF) -0.119** -0.248** -0.032*(-1.998) (-2.553) (-1.648)Ln(Innovation Index) -0.068* -0.173*** -0.035***(-1.840) (-2.729) (-3.385)Ln(SP exp. per unemployed) 0.030 0.003 -0.013(0.852) (0.049) (-1.383)Ln (Labor Force Index) -0.095 -0.200* -0.045***(-1.538) (-1.958) (-2.862)Constant 3.027*** 0.897 2.318***-4.424 (0.761) -14.702R-squared 0.998 0.974 0.999* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Regarding the results of estimation of this model, in Table 2, it is noticeable that the esti-
mated coefficient of one of the control variables, 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation, is significant and relatively high. One possible explanation is that less advanced countries are those that are reducing inequality and in the process of catching-up a set of variables show a positive evolution. One of them is the reduction of in-equality and another one is investment since this can be understood as one basic aspect for technological change. Innovation Composite 
Index is also significant, what is coherent with the theory. Meanwhile, social protection ex-penditures per unemployment rate doesn’t re-
sult significant, neither does Labor Composite 
Index in the estimation of the Gini Coefficient. A 1% increase in Gross Fixed Capital Forma-tion decreases inequality by 0.12%, 0.25% and 
0.03% measured by Gini Coefficient, S80/S20 Ratio and Top 10 Income Share respectively. A 1% increase in the Innovation Composi-te Index decreases inequality by 0.07%, 0.17% 
and 0.04% measured by Gini Coefficient, S80/S20 Ratio and Top 10 Income Share respectively.A 1% decrease in the Labor Compo-site Index increases inequality by 0.20% and 0.05% measured by S80/S20 Ratio and Top 10 Income Share respectively.These results provide some evidence of the theoretical argument stated above. No-netheless, another approach is being taken because as it was seen in the correlation gra-phs, it seems to be the existence of two clus-ters of countries, an aspect that depends on the country structural characteristics and that may serve as a plausible explanation for the differences found in the estimations. If this is the case, it is adequate to use a Between-country effects estima-
tor that would fit better the model; the results are then presented in Table 3.
Table 3. Estimation results. Composite Indexes 
Between Countries modelLn(Gini 
coefficient)
Ln(S80/S20 ratio) Ln(Top10 income)Ln(GDP per capita) 0.126* 0.204 0.043*-2.208 -1.831 -1.871Ln(GFCF) -0.094 -0.212 0.017(-0.667) (-0.761) (0.295)Ln(Innovation Index) -0.135* -0.254* -0.059**(-2.170) (-2.196) (-2.447)Ln(SP exp. per unemployed) -0.170** -0.257** -0.061**(-3.110) (-2.429) (-2.791)Ln(Right to bar-gain) 0.092** 0.108 0.021-2.600 -1.564 -1.507Ln(Union den-sity) -0.052 -0.058 -0.006(-1.642) (-0.923) (-0.502)Constant 2.238** -0.118 2.131***-2.795 (-0.076) -6.682R-squared 0.864 0.813 0.835* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 In this model, the Innovation Composi-
te Index results significant, and so does the social spending per unemployed rate. Labor 
market institutions do not result significant (and neither does Labor Composite Index).In particular, a 1% difference between countries in the Innovation Composite Index means a 0.14%, 0.25% and 0.06% lower in-
equality measured by Gini Coefficient, S80/S20 Ratio and Top 10 Income Share respectively. Meanwhile, a 1% difference between coun-tries in social expenditures per unemployment rate means a 0.17%, 0.26% and 0.06% lower in-
equality measured by Gini Coefficient, S80/S20 
Ratio and Top 10 Income Share respectively. 
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7. ConclusionsThe study of the relationship between se-veral measures of inequality and innovation, is extended in this paper including the rele-vant role of institutions. This contributes to analyze the existence of different clusters of countries according to “continental-Renan” style and “peripheral-Anglo Saxon” style. The 
first cluster is integrated by countries that exhibit ample social protection systems, as well as strong innovation institutions and low rates of inequality. The opposite happens to the other cluster of less advanced econo-mies, those which have a relatively narrower social protection system, weaker innovation institutions and higher rates of inequality.The fact is that the cluster composed by the relatively more advanced economies (continental-Renan type) has experienced a higher rise in inequality than the other, this composed by the relatively less advanced economies (peripheral-Anglo Saxon type) and where the initial rates of inequality were 
much lower than in the first group. Howe-ver, both clusters have some peculiarities:
• The more advanced economies include the Nordic countries and this is a special group because of their initial inequality rates, which were (and still are) the lowest in the world. Among them, there are some remarkable common facts observed such as very high GDP per capita, strong inno-vation institutions, high Union density rates and collective bargaining coverage, also combined with relatively high social protection per unemployed population expenditures. The same cluster also in-cludes the Renan-type economies, coun-tries with higher but still low initial rates of inequality that have not raised much, and even in some cases they have actually decreased. Nonetheless, they form a very 
well-defined cluster in some aspects such as high GDP per capita, strong innovation institutions or very high social protection expenditures but they show relative diffe-rences regarding labor force institutions. 
• The cluster that is integrated by less advanced economies include two An-glo-Saxon countries, Ireland and United Kingdom. They behave as less advanced economies regarding inequality rates, patents and Union density, but display frontier-effects or outliers regarding other innovation institutions, as well as social protection expenditures, collec-
tive bargaining coverage and GDP per capita. Moreover, their inequality rates have not risen in the studied period. This cluster also includes the peripheral-type countries. These countries exhibit high inequality rates (except Hungary) and 
behave as a well-defined cluster in each indicator with the exception of collective bargaining coverage. Inequality has not increased in these countries (except Bul-garia) in the entire period, but two trends are appreciated: On the one hand, before 
the financial crisis, inequality rates were decreasing at a substantial path, and after it stroke Europe, the trend has reversed and inequality has risen ever since. On the other, these countries have weak inno-vation institutions, as well as low Union density rates and low social protection ex-penditures per unemployed population. To be able to elaborate a set of policy re-commendations it’s important to focus both on the exploratory analysis on the real cases stu-died and on the results of econometric analy-sis. Time series-cross section analysis, combi-ned with between countries effects analysis, allows us to better understand the phenomena studied; the fact is that while some variables affect just one country’s evolution others exp-lain differences between countries. At the same time, the composition of indexes facilitates the interpretation of the phenomena as wholes. 
Our findings confirm the existence of a strong negative relationship between innova-tion institutions and inequality, regardless of the indicator employed or the development grade of the country analyzed. This relations-hip seems to be present both inter and intra countries, what means that the nature of the innovation institutions can be used to explain different growth rates of inequality between countries and also the evolution of an individual country’s inequality path. This is a contribu-tion to the existing literature, because this rela-tionship has not been yet profoundly analyzed. Innovation institutions and inequali-
ty define the broader gap between the two 
clusters of countries, and this finding may 
be useful to definitely orientate economic policies of a particular country to reduce its inequality levels. Investment in innova-tion institutions can reduce or at least slow down the growth of inequality rate both in the mid and in the long run. However, less advanced economies should not cease to in-
vest in gross fixed capital since it is necessary 
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for succeeding in the catching up pro-
cess and this also has significant effects on the reduction of inequality. Social protection systems explain diffe-rences in inequality rates between countries, as they usually are related to the country’s structural institutions. Hence, the more advan-ced economies, which are less unequal, tend to exhibit higher social protection expenditures.In addition, countries spending more on social protection have held back the increase in inequality, as can be observed when looking 
at the gap between Gini Coefficient before and after social transfers. Individual country’s ave-rage expenditures do not predict the evolution of its rise in inequality in the period studied. This way, we can conclude that the increase in social protection expenditures is necessary to press back the devastating effects of crisis in inequality, and maintaining a high level of expenditures is the base for an ample Welfa-re state. Nonetheless, it remains indispensa-ble to keep a sustained level of investments in order to walk towards a more equal country.It’s also important to remark that la-bor market institutions relate to the evolu-tion of the inequality rates intra-country, but not between countries. This is mostly due to the presence of Nordic countries in the sam-
ple, which have reduced significantly their Union density starting from very high rates, at the same time that they have experien-ced a rise of inequality though remaining at low rates. Hence, no conclusive economic policy prescription regarding labor market 
institutions can be made from our analysis.  
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Graph 12. Gini Coefficient before and after social transfers and Composite Index for Innovation
Sources: Eurostat, World Inequality IndicatorsNote: Economies included: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom
Graph 13. Gini Coefficient before and after social transfers and Social protection expenditures per 
unemployed population
Sources: Eurostat, World Inequality IndicatorsNote: Economies included: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom
Graph 14. Gini Coefficient before and after social transfers and Composite Index for Labor Force
Sources: Eurostat, World Inequality IndicatorsNote: Economies included: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom
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Graph 15. Gini Coefficient and R%D expenditures and personnel
Sources: Eurostat, World Inequality IndicatorsNote: Economies included: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom
Graph 16. Gini Coefficient and patent applications at EPO per million of active population
Sources: Eurostat, World Inequality IndicatorsNote: Economies included: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom
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Graph 17. Gini Coefficient and Social protection expenditures and total unemployment
Sources: Eurostat, World Inequality IndicatorsNote: Economies included: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom
Graph 18. Gini Coefficient and Union Density and Bargaining power
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